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1. Introduction
In this paper we look at the evolving model of corporate governance (herein-
after “CG”) in Russian commercial banks. It is an attempt of empirical analysis 
applied to a specific sector of the economy, with the help of methodology and in-
struments of institutional economics. Having to choose from many concepts and 
definitions of CG2, for the purposes of this study we stick to the ‘narrow’ defini-
tion of CG as a set of instruments and institutional mechanisms for protecting the 
rights of shareholders and company owners. 
Issues of CG in Russian banks have come to the fore of researchers’ and prac-
titioners’ agenda in the middle of this decade in connection with the practical 
steps of both major banks – Sberbank and VTB – towards equity markets, as well 
as many other banks’ plans to place shares on the market. CG is no longer the do-
main of interest of large international players and leading private banks with glo-
bal ambitions, but it involves a growing number of market participants including 
state-controlled banks. 
Russia’s banking sector shares main features and tendencies in the domain of CG 
with the rest of the national economy. Since early 990s, state withdrawal, partial 
privatization and liberalization accompanied the introduction of a set of institutions 
 The author acknowledges with thanks helpful feedback received from Tatyana 
Dolgopyatova, Daniеl McCarthy, Iikka Korhonen, Patrick Luternauer, Michel Perhirin, Sheila 
Puffer, Ivan Rodionov, Ivan Rozinskiy, Pekka Sutela, Natalia Volchkova, and Andrei Yakovlev. A 
short version of this paper was delivered at the 8th International academic conference ‘Economic 
Modernization and Social Development’ (Moscow, April –5, 2007) (Vernikov, 2007b). The full 
version was discussed at a seminar held by the State University – Higher School of Economics 
in April 2007. This study draws upon 5 years of personal experience in the financial sector, i.a. 
at the Central Bank of Russia, 2 international financial institutions, a foreign bank subsidiary in 
Moscow and 2 major private Russian banks. All views expressed are only the author’s own and 
should not be attributed to any entity. Facts and figures stem from publicly accessible sources only. 
I solely respond for all errors.
2 According to a narrow definition, CG is a set of instruments to protect the rights of 
company shareholder(-s). In a ‘broader’ sense CG refers to a system of relations, formalized and 
informal ones, between investors and the CEO, management board and other interested parties 
(stakeholders) (CBR, 2005). It is a set of institutional mechanisms that protect the property of a 
large number of investors and harmonize interests of different categories of investors and other 
stakeholders. CG might extend to all stakeholders (interested parties), including shareholders, 
managers, suppliers, creditors, clients, employees and even citizens living in the neighbourhood 
(Berglof, von Thadden, 999; Shiobara, 2006). A more practical view on CG distinguishes such 
aspects as ownership structure and external influences; shareholders’ rights and relations with 
related parties; transparency, information disclosure and audit; structure and effectiveness of the 
board of directors; internal control and risk management (Standard & Poor’s, 998; IFC, 2007).
 By institutions we mean steady norms and rules of human interaction. We distinguish be-
tween institutions and organizations: if institutions are the rules of the game, then organizations 
are the players (North, 990).
УДК 6.7.078.
ББК 65.262.
 V46
Vernikov A. Corporate governance and control in Russian banks. Working paper 
WP/2007/02. – Moscow: State University – Higher School of Economics, 2007. – 
40 p.
The Working Paper employs the paradigm of new institutional economics to examine 
peculiarities of the Russian model of corporate governance and control in the banking sector. 
The study relies upon theoretical as well as applied research of corporate governance in 
Russian commercial banks featuring different forms of ownership. We focus on real interests 
of all stakeholders, namely bank and stock market regulators, bank owners, investors, top 
managers and other insiders. The Anglo-American concept of corporate governance, based 
on agency theory and implying outside investors’ control over banks through stock market, 
is found to bear limited relevance. We suggest some ways of overcoming the gap between 
formal institutions of governance and the real life.
Key words: Corporate governance; control; banks; Russia; institutions; ownership; 
management; blockholder; state.
УДК6.7.078. 
ББК 65.262.
Верников А.В. Корпоративное управление и контроль в российских банках. Пре-
принт WP/2007/02 . – М.: ГУ ВШЭ, 2007. – 40 с. (на английском языке).
В работе рассматриваются особенности российской модели корпоративного уп-
равления (corporate governance) и контроля в банковском секторе. Используется па-
радигма неоинституциональной экономической теории. Исследование опирается 
на обзор теоретических работ и на прикладной анализ состояния corporate gover-
nance в российских коммерческих банках, представляющих различные формы соб-
ственности. Особое внимание уделено анализу реальных интересов всех участников 
corporate governance – банковских и фондовых регуляторов, собственников банков, 
инвесторов, высших менеджеров и иных инсайдеров. Делается вывод о невысокой 
релевантности англо-американской концепции corporate governance, основанной на 
теории агентских издержек и предполагающей контроль внешних акционеров над 
банками через механизм фондового рынка. Предлагаются способы преодоления 
разрыва между формальными институтами и реальной жизнью.
© Vernikov A., 2007 
© Оформление. Издательский дом ГУ ВШЭ, 2007
Препринты ГУ ВШЭ размещаются на сайте
http://new.hse.ru/C3/C18/preprintsID/default.aspx.
V46
Редактор серии WP  
«Институциональные проблемы российской экономики» 
А.А. Яковлев
4 5
2. Literature
La Porta et al. (999) survey the main contemporary concepts of corporate gov-
ernance. Black et al. (2000) inquire what went wrong with Russian privatization and 
CG. Hellman et al. (2000) introduce the notion of state capture by private interests, 
measure governance and corruption, and discuss how firms and bureaucrats shape 
the business environment in transition countries. Radygin and Entov (200) under-
take an empirical analysis of CG in the context of property rights protection. Guriev 
et al. (200) identify general trends in CG among Russian industrial companies. Ya-
kovlev (200) evaluates demand for formal institutions (law) in the area of CG and 
tracks the evolution of economic agents’ behavior strategies. Radygin et al. (2004) 
review economic and legal factors and constraints to the emergence of corporate 
governance models. Dolgopyatova (2004) studies property and corporate control in 
Russian companies. The book edited by McCarthy, Puffer and Shekshnia (2004) col-
lects contributions from scholars and practitioners with a diversity of backgrounds 
to trace the shaping of a national model of CG in Russia, including its main sources 
and ‘inputs’. Yakovlev (2004) compares government policy with real incentives of 
economic agents to better understand the main drivers of evolution of CG in Russia. 
Kapelyushnikov (2005) shows why the ‘blockholder model’ has greater explanatory 
power as compared to the usual ‘insider model’ when dealing with economies with 
high concentration of ownership. ‘Blockholder’ stands for a controlling shareholder. 
Andreff (2005a; 2005b) reviews CG structures in post-socialist economies to find out 
whether Central and Eastern Europe has developed its own specific model of corpo-
rate control and whether it is relevant for Russia as well. IET (2005) evaluates the cur-
rent level of corporate governance in Russian industrial firms, demand for corporate 
governance standards and relations between ownership structure, investment needs 
and quality of corporate governance. Avdasheva et al. (2006) analyze CG and man-
agement in Russian companies. Shiobara (2006) elaborates the key notions of CG in 
the Russian context by drawing attention to such categories as ‘final proprietors’ and 
‘true proprietors’ when discussing the structure of the property. McCarthy and Puffer 
(2006) offer a theoretical framework for evaluation of the ethicality of corporate de-
cisions in Russia, with the help of integrative social contracts theory rather than the 
mainstream of agency theory. Yakovlev (2006) suggests that business – state interac-
tion in Russia has evolved into a combination of state capture and business capture. 
Puffer and McCarthy (2007) look at the main features and varieties of the Russian 
model of governance they call ‘network capitalism’, and compare supply and demand 
of institutions governing the behavior of Russian corporations. 
We are not aware of scholarly papers devoted specifically to the subject of CG 
in Russian banks4, so this paper aims to start filling the gap.
4 Penetration of Western concepts of CG into Russia has triggered an abundant stream of 
publications of normative nature, written by staff of international institutions, international audit 
through which new owners control and protect their belongings. A consensus view 
of experts has awarded the title of ‘insider model’ to the emerging model of CG. 
In the banking sector the ‘insider model’ acquires peculiar shape and has specific 
manifestations. There has been no formal privatization of commercial banks, and 
banks were eschewed from voucher privatizations, for shares-for-loans schemes, 
and other centrally-driven efforts. Nevertheless many banks or their valuable assets 
have effectively changed hands over the last 2 decades. There is no such thing in 
the banking sector as a truly public corporation with widely dispersed stock. Every 
lending institution in the country has a blockholder, usually an individual one, less 
commonly a consolidated group of blockholder partners. Despite opaque modes of 
transformation, property in the banking sector is reallocated seamlessly and peace-
fully if judged by the standards of Russian industries. It indicates that the emerging 
model of corporate governance has been efficient so far in meeting its objectives. 
Finally, an active direct involvement of the Russian state in the banking sector has 
led to specific modalities of governance among public sector entities, and con-
cepts of ‘state capture’ and ‘business capture’ need to be redefined here to regain 
explanatory and predictive power.
The purpose of the paper is to try answering the following questions:
(a) How consistent is the CG system in Russian banks with the ‘national 
model’ of CG and what distinguishes it?
(b) Does the present model of CG work well for Russian banks?
(c) What are the practical implications for investors and for banking sector 
regulators?
The concept of CG is broader than just matters of ownership protection and 
control, but due to space limitation we had to restrict the scope of this study. Sub-
sequent research will pursue relevant and challenging topics such as a comparative 
analysis of evolution of CG among banks in emerging market countries in Southeast 
Asia and Latin America whose initial institutional setup might have been closer to 
Russia’s than that in advanced economies in Europe and North America. 
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows: Section 2 offers a short overview of 
relevant literature. Section 3 describes main features of the model of governance in 
Russian banks and its consistency with the system of governance in industrial com-
panies. Section 4 attempts to identify the real interests of main groups of stakehold-
ers with respect to further evolution of CG in banks. We then discuss some practi-
cal implications of our analysis for investors in Russian banks (Section5). Section 6 
suggests a few directions for government policies aimed at strengthening the foun-
dation of CG. Section 7 summarizes the main findings.
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What makes CG a topical issue for Russia is the existence of banking entities 
not integrated into multinational firm structures. Russia differs from most other 
transition economies in the sense that it has preserved a vast national sector in the 
banking industry. There are very few large national banks left in the countries of 
Central and Eastern European (CEE)6 and South-Eastern Europe where bank-
ing sectors consist predominantly of foreign subsidiary banks, branches of foreign 
banks and local banks controlled by foreign entities (Figure ). Practically all lead-
ing providers of banking services now belong to regional or global network banks 
(UniCredit of Italy, Erste Bank and Raiffeisen Bank of Austria, KBC of Belgium, 
Société Générale of France, etc.)7. 
Banks are bound by a set of formal and informal institutions identical to those 
binding companies in other sectors of the Russian economy; they all are placed in 
the same economic and institutional environment. In general, Russian corporate 
6 ‘CEE’ refers to 8 post-socialist economies (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) that joined the European Union by the time of writing 
of the paper.
7 For instance, an assessment of CG in the leading Slovak banks, would imply an assessment 
of CG quality at the head offices of Erste Bank, Banca Intesa and Raiffeisen Bank that own, 
respectively, Slovenská Sporitelna, VUB and Tatra Banka.
Source: CBR data; Raiffeisen, 2006; own calculation.
Figure 1: Structure of the national banking sector, 
as percentage of total banking assets, 0.0.2006 (* 0.0.2006)
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3. Ownership, control and governance  
in Russian banks: Status quo
Several initiatives aimed at assessing CG in Russian banks exist. Standard & 
Poor’s (a rating agency) pioneers in the assignment of CG ratings to Russian corpo-
rate and banks, on the basis of elaborate methodology (Standard & Poor’s, 998)5. 
IFC (2004) offers a comprehensive study of all aspects of CG in a sample group of 
50 banks to understand the extent to which ‘internationally recognized best prac-
tices’ of CG are implemented in the day-to-day activities of the Russian banks. In 
2004–2007 the IFC project is continued, resulting in a detailed report on progress 
in various areas of CG, this time based on a stronger sample group (IFC, 2007). The 
report looms into such elements of broadly-defined CG as adherence to the prin-
ciples of good governance, the role and practices of the board of directors and the 
board of management, information disclosure and transparency, internal control, 
audit and risk management, and protection of shareholders’ rights. IFC concludes 
that the level of CG in Russian banks stands at an acceptable level but remains far 
from perfect. The report does not reveal a systematic and serious abuse of share-
holders’ rights, mostly due to the chosen method of data collection, i.e. self-ap-
praisal by bank officials. IFC indicates that requirements protecting shareholders 
are generally complied with, which comes as no surprise given that a small group 
of people controls overwhelming blocks of shares and at the same time sits in the 
management bodies of the bank. Validity of conclusions depends on the width of 
the gap between self-appraisal and formalistic compliance, on one hand, and the 
real functioning of control mechanisms, on the other; the latter falls beyond the 
scope of the IFC report.
firms, rating agencies, strategic consultancies, executive search firms, and Russian collaborators 
and disciples of all the above. Some of this literature tackles CG matters with specific regard to 
financial institutions. Most of the sources referred to above represent Russian-language versions 
and interpretations of English-language literature. Their thrust is to promote Anglo-American 
concepts and experience of CG, to highlight potential advantages of ‘good CG’ and to describe 
how things should be in Russia. For the purposes of this study we disregard normative literature 
(except for Russian laws and official documents) and propaganda materials on CG.
5 Standard & Poor’s focuses on the following groups of issues to comprehensively evalu-
ate CG: ownership structure and external influences; shareholders’ rights and relations with 
related parties; transparency, disclosure and audit; and structure and effectiveness of the 
board of directors. While recognizing inexistence of a single world standard of CG to serve 
as benchmark for countries with diverse traditions and cultures, Standard & Poor’s apply 
in their evaluations and grading the principles of integrity, transparency, accountability and 
responsibility. Interpretation of such principles can differ in each society under the influence 
of national cultural norms. If so, then CG ratings, especially those on the ‘international scale’, 
represent but a numerical expression of approximation to a notional benchmark rooted in CG 
‘best practice’ of U.S.A. and U.K.
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over their respective institutions in the course of state withdrawal and reorganiza-
tion, or transferred assets to newly-born private banks, or both. 
Russia features high concentration of ownership and control tending to exceed 
75% of equity at each company (Yakovlev, 200). The situation in Russian bank-
ing from the viewpoint of ownership concentration fits the description by Morck 
and Steier (2005): a handful of immensely wealthy families (in the Russian case, 
individuals) control the largest companies. Not a single Russian bank qualifies to 
be a ‘corporation’ in the Anglo-American sense, i.e. a listed company with a broad 
capital base and liquid stock. Empirical evidence points to the prevalence of ‘block-
holder model’. In the banking system that role is performed by an individual per-
son, a consolidated group or the state (Kapelyushnikov, 2005). Institutional inves-
tors start gaining a role of importance. Blockholders make a decisive impact on the 
management and strategy of the company; they shape and lead boards of directors 
and appoint top managers. Officially reported data might suggest that ownership 
structure is changing in the direction of broader participation of outsider investors: 
in the sample of banks surveyed by IFC (2007), 9% of banks responded that they 
have between  and 0 shareholders, 2% – between  and 50, 2% – between 5 
and ,000, and 4% – over ,000 shareholders. This statistical phenomenon mis-
represents the reality, and recognition of a wide gap between formally registered 
data and the true structure of ownership is a commonplace. Nominal sharehold-
ing, which can consist of multiple intermediate layers, does not reflect real con-
trol. Decision-making is highly personified and usually embodied in one person 
who may or may not appear as a registered shareholder. Focus on such categories 
as ‘final owners’ and ‘true owners’ is needed to get a fair idea of ownership and 
control structure (Avdasheva et al., 2006; Shiobara, 2006). Russian law contains 
vague definitions of beneficiary ownership, and its public disclosure is essentially 
voluntary, but for banks disclosure to the regulator became stringent after 2005 in 
the context of deposit insurance introduction.
Each of the top 0 Russian banks has a blockholder in the shape of either the 
State, or a foreign controlling entity, or a private individual, less frequently a tight 
group of private individuals who happen to be relatives or close business partners. 
Table  contains a list of Russia’s largest banks, consolidating 64.7% of total bank-
ing assets and 59% of capital, and their respective blockholder(s). In cases where 
bank ownership structure is not officially disclosed, informal sources also indicate 
the existence of a blockholder. The identity of blockholders may not necessarily be 
known to the broad public or even the bank’s managers: in only 69% of cases the 
members of the top executive team confirm awareness of who the bank’s ultimate 
owners are. The assumption that members of the board of directors are the indi-
viduals in control of the bank does not find an immediate support. 9% of bank 
representatives report that members of their board of directors own less than 0% 
of bank shares, 8% of banks report a stake between 20% and 40%, % report a 
legislation is quite a developed one – it provides for such institutions and mecha-
nisms as codes of corporate conducts, mechanisms of protection to minority share-
holders and small investors, financial and other information disclosure, elected 
boards of directors, independent non-executive directors, and control over con-
flict of interest in corporate decisions. Since early 990s Russia adopts a broad set 
of formal institutions of CG borrowed from various developed market economies 
(Puffer, McCarthy, 2004; Radygin et al., 2004). Formal institutions of CG do exist 
now in the Russian banking sector, but the degree to which they regulate the actual 
relations between stakeholders varies greatly from one area to another. Their pen-
etration is deepest where they lead to creation of new corporate bodies (e.g. a board 
of directors), do not come into conflict with existing groups of interest, and do not 
increase transaction costs to unbearable level. When, however, new norms have the 
potential of undermining the efficient control of blockholders over their property, 
or become too costly and burdensome to comply with, compliance become a pure 
formality, i.e. observance of the form with disregard to the substance.
Unlike CEE countries that consistently borrowed a full set of European formal 
institutions embodied in the acquis communautaire, the Russian government did 
not limit the range of possible institutional sources to just Europe. Russia chose to 
borrow separate institutions from a variety of donor societies, resulting in a set of 
inconsistent and mutually contradictory norms and institutions. For instance, in-
stitutions governing stock markets resemble those existing in the U.K. and U.S.A., 
while banking law leans towards continental European patterns. Governance struc-
ture within a bank then becomes misaligned with exogenous institutions and disci-
plining mechanisms of the stock market. While the system of ‘2 boards’ (a board of 
directors and a management board) stems from European influence, Anglo-Ameri-
can system of law supplies mechanisms applicable to minority shareholders, dis-
closure, non-executive directors, fiduciary responsibility, directors’ liability insur-
ance, etc. The main body of law on shareholding companies and stock markets is 
supplemented by the Code of Corporate Conduct (FCSM, 2002) recommended 
by the Russian stock market regulator but not enforced. The adoption of the Code 
might be interpreted as the regulator’s attempt to implement in Russia the Ameri-
can style of governance (Shiobara, 2006, p. ).
Regardless of formal norms, Russian industrial business groups and banks alike 
have developed an explicitly ‘insider model’ of corporate control and governance. 
It reflects the predominant role played by company insiders in the privatization in 
990s. Banks were not subject to voucher privatization or ‘loans-for-shares’ schemes. 
On the contrary, new Russian capitalists used their banks as vehicles to accumu-
late assets in the course of privatization and to grab valuable industrial companies 
through ‘loans-for-shares’ schemes. A substantial proportion of assets of state-owned 
banks was reallocated to insiders, top managers in the first place, who either took 
0 
stake between 40% and 70%, and in 0% of banks members of the board are said to 
control over 70% of equity (IFC, 2007). Such data reflect formal (nominal) hold-
ing rather than ultimate ownership which we expect to reveal a much higher con-
centration of stock in the hands of board of directors.
Alien concepts of CG make it into formal norms (law) and are subsequently 
complied with or imitated by market participants, but have limited impact on the 
structure of control and therefore the mode of governance. Each bank registered 
as a joint-stock company maintains its own set of documents including codes of 
corporate conduct, codes of ethics, regulations of the board of directors, informa-
tion disclosure regulation, and so on. The gap between legal form of a bank (joint-
stock company) and the true control structure (private company or partnership) is 
a formidable example of a superficial formalistic adoption of Western institutions 
of CG. Provided that IFC reviews a representative sample of banks, two-thirds of 
the Russian banking industry consists of OAOs, or public joint stock companies 
(Figure 2); OAOs command a greater yet market share in terms of assets. Prevalence 
of the OAO legal form partly results from the state withdrawal because legally the 
state could only maintain a residual stake in a public company, so all such compa-
nies nation-wide acquired a corresponding legal status. Enforced transformation 
of state-owned enterprises into OAO created tens of thousands of fictitious public 
companies that do not need external investors and permanently generate corpo-
rate conflicts (Yakovlev, 200). 
Legal status of a bank bears no relation with the structure of control. Some of 
the ‘open joint-stock companies’ actually have very few shareholders8. Many of the 
banks registered as OAO possess formal decorations of a public company, includ-
ing a full set of top-notch documentation regulating CG (codes of corporate con-
ducts, elaborate regulations of the board of directors and its committees) and even 
non-executive directors. In many cases individuals who stand ballot as ‘independ-
ent’ directors are as a matter of fact affiliated with the bank owners, management 
or other important insiders. 
The system of governance at the 22% of Russian banks organized as ‘ZAO’ or 
‘closed joint-stock companies’ (an originally Russian bizarre legal form in between 
a public corporation and a limited liability company) is that of a private company 
or partnership, not a joint-stock company. On a general note, we observe similar 
features in CG at banks belonging to diverse legal forms (OAO, ZAO, OOO); the 
national model of CG works across traditional partitions by type of ownership, le-
gal form, geographical location, and size of the bank.
8 According to official disclosure, on January , 2007, OAO MDM-Bank had two sharehold-
ers, one of them, OOO MDM Banking Holding, owning 98.7% of shares (www.mdmbank.ru/
f//about/emitent/mdm_2006q.pdf).  The bank’s stock is not traded in any exchange. 2 natural 
persons have been disclosed as final beneficiaries through a chain of intermediate holding com-
panies in Cyprus and Austria.
Table 1: Blockholders of top 0 Russian banks
Rank* Bank Blockholder, % of capital / voting power
 Sberbank CBR, 60.4% / 6.8%
2 Vneshtorgbank Federal Government – 99.9%
 Gazprombank Gazprom JSC
4 Alfa-Bank Mr. Fridman – 6.5%, Mr. Khan – 2.%,  
Mr. Kuzmichev – 8.%
5 Bank Moskvy Moscow City authorities
6 UralSib Mr. Alekperov, Mr. Tsvetkov, Bashkortostan Government
7 Rosbank Mr. Potanin – 50%, Mr. Prokhorov – 50%
8 Raiffeisenbank Raiffeisen International (Austria)
9 Russian Standard Mr. Tariko 
0 Rosselkhozbank Federal Government
 International Moscow B. UniCredit Group (Italy)
2 MDM Bank Mr. Popov – 90%**
 Promstroybank VTB Group, Federal Government
4 Promsvyazbank Mr. A.Ananyev, Mr. D.Ananyev – 00%
5 VTB 24 VTB Group, Federal Government
6 Citibank Citigroup (USA)
7 Petrokommerz Mr. Fedun, Mr. Alekperov
8 Nomos-Bank Mr. Finogenov, Mr. Nesis 
9 Mezhprombank Mr. Pugachev – 72%
20 Ak Bars Tatarstan Government***
2 Zenit Tatarstan Government*** 
22 Transkreditbank Russian Railways JSC – 75%
2 Vozrozhdenie Mr. Orlov
24 Globex Mr. Motylev
25 MBRR Mr. Yevtushenkov, Moscow City authorities
26 Impexbank Raiffeisen International (Austria)
27 Sibakadembank Mr. Kim, Mr. Taranov, Mr. Bekarev
28 BINbank Mr. Shishkhanov, Mr. Kerimov
29 Khanty-Mansiysky bank Khanty-Mansiysk regional government – 9%
0 ING Bank (Eurasija) ING Group (Netherlands)
* By assets, 0.0.06; ** The bank’s official disclosure by 0.0.2007 does not indicate the final 
beneficiary of the holding company that owns 98.7% of shares. *** Indirectly via state-controlled 
industrial companies.
Source: bank data; media reports.
2 
In our opinion, in the banking sector a business is associated with a legal entity to 
a greater degree than in other industrial sectors. Through obligatory disclosure re-
quirements the corporate ownership relations among affiliated banks become suffi-
ciently transparent to the regulator and, partially, to general public. More demand-
ing nature of bank licensing and supervision, as compared to industrial enterprises, 
neuters some of the advantages of running several banks as a single business group 
and increases the disadvantages thereof. Being part of a banking group just offers 
additional flexibility in inter-company placement of liquidity and potentially some 
benefits from a marketing viewpoint. Still, for most practical purposes each bank 
of the group is regulated as a stand-alone entity with respect to taxation, minimum 
statutory capital requirement, capital adequacy, observance of prudential ratios, 
composition of management bodies, etc. Banking groups of pyramidal shape face 
additional capital requirement because one bank’s investment into another bank’s 
shares exceeding % of capital reduces the amount of equity calculated for pru-
dential regulation purposes. Delegation of managerial functions from one bank to 
another is rare. Unlike in the productive sectors where business groups represent a 
sustainable form of management, in banking groups the existence of separate inde-
pendent entities bears a transitory nature because such entities either get consoli-
dated and integrated on a single platform or resold to another owner. 
Another feature of the Russian model of corporate control is that majority 
owners of Russian industrial companies tend to extract income from their hold-
ings via control over cash flows rather than through dividend payments (Rozinskiy, 
2002; Yakovlev, 200). Banks do not constitute an exception with this regard: the 
schedules and amounts of dividend payments, if any, by banks to shareholders re-
main erratic.
The main features of ‘insider model’ of corporate control and governance in 
Russia banks, namely untransparency of ownership structure, high ownership con-
centration and the exercise of management functions by owners, derive from ob-
jective conditions and factors to which owners are exposed, primarily the weakness 
of ownership protection instruments, exogenous and internal alike (Dolgopyatova, 
2004). The main interest of blockholders has until recently centered on ensuring 
solid control and defending their property against hostile takeover attempts by ri-
val groupings, managers, or the state. Blockholders now possess the mechanisms of 
corporate control that are consistent with their goal of achieving an unchallenge-
able control over their banks and defending it against aggression from other par-
ties. This model enabled a peaceful transfer of property in comparison with other 
industrial sectors – practically all mergers and acquisitions of banks are amicable. 
Private owners of Russian banks remain actively involved in the management and 
immediate oversight of their business, leaving little room for managerial oppor-
tunism and lowering agency costs. In sum, the situation with governance reflects 
a ‘bad equilibrium’ that may be suboptimal, but economic and political agents in-
The functions of corporate ownership and management are intertwined in Rus-
sian companies, in general, and banks, in particular. Blockholders usually sit on the 
board of directors and/or the management board and exercise direct control over 
the bank’s activities. Data on presence of bank owners in executive management 
bodies as CEOs or executive directors reflect just the formal set up; the true degree 
of owners’ involvement in bank management could only be measured through in-
formal polls among insiders (unfeasible). Our personal observations suggest a sub-
stantial degree of owners’ participation in the exercise of executive functions in at 
least  out of 4 private Russian banks. 
Instead of individual companies, business groups emerge as an essential unit for 
analysis of corporate relations in the Russian industry (Avdasheva et al., 2006). It 
is related to the phenomenon of ‘recombinant property’ which implies means that 
corporate centers in charge of decision-making and major transaction structuring 
are located beyond the legal boundaries of an individual enterprise; legally-regis-
tered property rights differ from effective ones, and control mechanisms are blurred 
(Stark, 997). The tendency to create business groups equally applies to the banking 
sector. Not all of the ,4 nominally independent lending organizations in exist-
ence in Russia are in reality stand-alone businesses. Banks make part of industrial 
groupings (conglomerates) or become the center-pieces of multi-sectoral holdings 
(Klepach, Yakovlev, 2004). There are as well between 20 and 0 specialized bank-
ing business groups that include entities belonging to the same beneficiary(-ies). 
Source: IFC, 2007.
Figure 2: Russian banks by legal form of establishment
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tions were formally implemented, but they are not properly employed nor adhered 
to in substance. Cultural and institutional aspects are overlooked by authors who 
believe that CG institutions imported from the U.S.A. represent an obvious direc-
tion of ‘progress’ for Russian companies and regulators and that there is no much 
room for a specific national model of CG. In reality, new CG institutions mix with 
existing informal norms of behaviour and adapt to actual relations between stake-
holders. We attribute the intensity of institutional competition between ‘old’ and 
‘new’ norms to the fact that Russian banking industry is more or less evenly split 
between public and private sectors, so neither form of property dominates, and as 
a result, neither type of economic actors – state-owned banks or private banks – 
lead in the shaping of rules of the game (‘institutions’).
We distinguish a few modifications of the ‘blockholder model’ of governance 
among Russian banks, rather than one solid clear-cut model. Each group of banks 
has specific features along with common ones. Large banks of the public sector dis-
play blurred control lines and mechanisms and serious agency problems. Large pri-
vate banks are featured by high concentration of property, prevalence of informal 
mechanisms of control, and untransparency; agency problem is less relevant here. 
In lower tiers of private banks a conflict of interest constantly arises from execu-
tion of ownership and management functions by the same people; phenomena of 
state capture and business capture can oddly co-exist here; minority interests do 
not exist or are not represented. Foreign subsidiary banks and Russian banks under 
strategic foreign control simulate CG while being actually governed as branches, 
not corporations (Vernikov, 2005).
An overview of CG in banks needs to give due regard to the public sector, in 
view of its particular and growing role in the Russian banking. IFC surveys (IFC, 
2004; 2007) do not cover public sector banks due to mandate restrictions0. Public 
sector, however, is a crucial component of the Russian banking system. Withdrawal 
of the Russian state from commercial banks has been inconsistent and limited in 
scope; core banks remain in public property. Since the 998 crisis we estimate the 
share of public sector banks in total assets to have grown up to 44%, exceeding 
the share of the domestic private sector (Figure ). Poland and Slovenia also keep 
0 IFC works exclusively with private sector companies in the countries of operations. Still, 
eschewing public sector banks, as well as banks with a share of foreign legal persons exceeding 
25% of capital, from the scope of analysis leaves its conclusions applicable to a category of market 
players representing less than one-half of Russia’s total.
 We use certain criteria to allocate a bank in the public sector (Vernikov, 2007). The state, its 
federal and regional authorities, municipal authorities, Central Bank of Russia, companies effec-
tively controlled by one of the above entities and/or individual government official must exercise 
decisive influence on a bank’s activities, whether they appear as listed shareholders of a bank or 
not. Lax public disclosure standards do not permit correct allocation based on official data only. 
Judgmental element is inevitable, but we estimate the possible margin of error resulting from 
misallocation at no more than % of total banking assets.
terested in changing the system do not demand high quality institutions (Yakov-
lev, 200; 2004a). 
Continental European and Japanese model of capital accumulation relies on 
banks, and Anglo-American model assigns the top role to capital markets. Morck 
and Steier (2005) call it ‘bank capitalism’ vs. ‘shareholder capitalism’. None of 
these international models of CG clearly prevails in the Russian industry (Rady-
gin et al., 2004) and banking. The selection of formal institutions of CG to be bor-
rowed was influenced by advisors adhering to the Anglo-American model based on 
agency theory and aimed at protecting small investors and preventing opportunistic 
behavior by top managers. Those priorities rapidly turned out to be irrelevant in the 
Russian circumstances. Social institutions responsible for enforcing discipline do 
not function, agency theory does not work as top managers are often the same per-
sons as shareholders, and minority shareholders do not exist. Facing this reality, the 
newly-emerging Russian model of CG started to lean towards a German/Japanese 
model of governance that relies more upon social networks and embraces the in-
terests of all stakeholders, not only private shareholders (Puffer, McCarthy, 2004). 
That is more consistent with the thrust of Russia’s traditional norms of behavior 
but less aligned with the already existing (on paper) formal norms of CG. While 
the 2 main international ‘models’ of CG differ indeed, a process of convergence 
takes place internationally and mitigates such differences, especially for compa-
nies exposed to capital markets discipline. The continental European model and 
the Anglo-American model of governance have essential common features such as 
reliance upon rule of law, transparency, trust, contract enforcement and property 
rights protection. These features have not existed in Russia whose business culture 
and governance are traditionally associated with disregard to legal norms, oppor-
tunism9, lack of trust, strong reliance on personal relations and close networks, 
untransparency, secrecy, and equalitarianism (Avtonomov, 997; Kuzminov et al., 
2005; Prokhorov, 2006). McCarthy and Puffer (2007) argue that the norms under-
lying agency theory can be inappropriate for interpreting the ethicality of CG de-
cisions and behaviors of Russians; integrative social contracts theory is suggested 
to have more explanatory power with regard to the ethical conflict between tradi-
tional Russian values and market-oriented values. 
The system of CG that has emerged in Russia represents a compromise between 
the endogenous priority of defending business against external challenges and the 
push for innovations in the area of CG coming from exogenous sources, namely 
the government and the central bank as top bank regulator. CG norms and institu-
9 Opportunism that endangers private property rights is typical for individual banks as market 
participants, as well as for executive and legal authorities. In 998–999, opportunistic behav-
ior of Russian banks that had entered into currency forward contracts was endorsed by courts 
(Vernikov, 2006; 2007).
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ed wings of the government ‘in charge’ of that bank. State-owned banks get effec-
tively ‘captured’ by insiders, particularly their own top managers, who might own 
private businesses on the side. 
4. Upgrading corporate governance in Russian banks: 
Cui bono?12 
The universality of CG concept should not be overestimated. In a certain con-
text and at a certain stage of economic development CG might be more relevant 
and important than at other stages (Berglof, von Thadden, 999). When, why and 
to what extent CG does matter – can be determined only empirically (Shiobara, 
2006). In this section we try to identify the combination of interests driving the ev-
olution of CG in Russian banks. 
Standard & Poor’s identify a broad range of stakeholders potentially interested 
in the application of the mainstream concept of CG and its practical implementation 
by Russian banks. Relying on practical evidence and personal estimate, we narrow 
that range to the following 4 main groups, in the decreasing order of importance, 
whose interests shape the public discussion of CG in Russian banks:
financial intermediaries and consultants, including international institu-
tions; 
foreign lenders and minority investors;
controlling owners of Russian banks; 
bank regulators.
Financial intermediaries and consultants,  
including international institutions
As a financial sector insider the author has witnessed the magnitude of supply 
of consultancy, advisory, technical assistance, teaching, coaching, and the like, in 
the field of governance. CG is a consultant’s dream product because it is 00% po-
litically correct, carries insignificant costs and no measurable risks, does not allow 
for accurate cost-benefit analysis by the recipient, and triggers no responsibility in 
case it goes wrong or yields no result. Consultant’s interest goes well beyond theory 
2 Who benefits? (lat.)
 Standard & Poor’s indicate that their CG ratings meet demand from the following catego-
ries of stakeholders: shareholders (minority as well as majority ones); lenders; the management; 
members of the board of directors; regulators and stock exchanges; insurance companies offering 
directors and officers liability insurance; politicians; financial intermediaries and consultants; 
analysts; company staff; and other interested parties (Standard & Poor’s, 998).
•
•
•
•
large banks in state property, but Russia is the only European economy in transi-
tion with a consistently growing share of public sector in banking.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) that on 
behalf of the world’s leading economies sets standards in CG, recognizes that CG 
in state-owned enterprises constitutes a special case compared to universal princi-
ples (OECD, 2004; 2005). Interests and motivation of stakeholders of public sec-
tor banks differs from those in private companies in that profit and value maxi-
mization may be supplemented by non-economic motivations. Agency problem 
acquires specific shape in state-owned banks because the principal is diluted: the 
state can only control management performance through civil servants, i.e. indi-
viduals who may also act opportunistically in pursuit of their private interests. The 
state’s inability to efficiently run or oversee all public sector banks due to lack and 
low quality of its managerial resource broadens the autonomy of the banks’ top 
management who are likely to come to terms with individual officials and select-
* Foreign ownership exceeding 50% of charter capital.
Source: Own calculations and estimates based on CBR data.
Figure 3: Breakdown of the Russian banking sector by ownership, 
as percentage of total banking assets by January 
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circumstances may turn protection of shareholders’ rights into an irrelevant issue. 
Still, IFC focuses on the status of minority shareholders (those controlling less than 
20% of equity) on the ground that for the bank’s reputation in capital markets it is 
essential that such shareholders’ rights be equally protected, even if they (minority 
shareholders) are not in a position to shape the bank’s strategy.
The interest of foreign lenders and small investors in promoting CG grows in 
parallel with the amount of lending to and portfolio investment in Russian banks. 
Between 0.0.200 and 0.0.2006 the amount of outstanding foreign loans to 
Russian banks increased six-fold, from USD 8.0bn to USD 48.bn (www.cbr.ru/
statistics/). The magnitude of portfolio investment in Russian banks grows slightly 
faster than foreign direct investment in this sector, so that its cumulative volume 
now exceeds the volume of direct investment (Figures 4 and 5). In the middle of 
this decade, portfolio investors for the first time started to diversify from Sberbank 
in favor of other Russian banks. 
Would-be foreign investors and lenders are attracted by high profitability of Rus-
sian banks, impressive rates of growth of financial assets, and the potential of the 
national market for financial services. The current system of CG has worked well 
for blockholders of Russian banks but not for actual minority holders of shares or 
potential buyers who are deterred by high concentration, opacity, low transparency, 
Source: Central Bank of Russia, balance of payments statistics.
Figure 4: Foreign investment in Russian banks (cumulative volume by January )
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and best-practice sharing. CG advisory serves as a door-opener to establish links 
with the client in anticipation of future (profitable) mandates for investment bank-
ing. CG-related consultancy accompanies the preparation of hundreds of Russian 
companies for capital market issues4. Consultants, investment bankers, portfolio 
managers and traders all push for greater transparency and CG practices in order 
to involve Russian banks into the global market and set a frame for higher profits 
from investment banking or trading at the next stage.
International institutions pursue their own respective agendas containing a three-
fold objective. Firstly, these institutions have indeed the mandate of promoting ‘best 
international practice’ in developing and transition economies. Secondly, institutions 
such as IMF and the World Bank (including IFC that spearheads the CG effort in 
the Russian banking sector) act under strong influence of their major shareholders, 
primarily the U.S.A., to promote a heavily-politicized agenda that recently focuses 
sharply on prevention of terrorism financing and ‘money laundering’ worldwide. 
Hence the push for greater bank transparency and information disclosure, stronger 
compliance and internal audit. Thirdly, international bodies promote private in-
terests of important market players and act on their behalf in immature markets, 
breaking ice and preceding large-scale investment of private capital.
Foreign lenders and minority investors
In the private sector the concentration of property reaches such a degree that 
many banks do not possess unaffiliated minority shareholders who would demand 
protection against the opportunism of blockholders. IFC (2007) data say that only 
% of banks have shares circulating in stock markets. According to information 
from stock exchanges, stocks of 8 Russian banks (out of a total of ,4) currently 
float. MICEX stock exchange lists shares of Sberbank, Bank Moskvy, Vozrozhde-
nie, Avangard, Finprombank, International Bank St. Petersburg, Rosbank, Tarkh-
any, Industrial and Construction Bank, Primorye, Metkombank, and Bank Dal-
nevostochny. RTS stock exchange lists six bank shares, namely Sberbank, Rosbank, 
Sibakadembank, Sobinbank, Stella-Bank, and Vozrozhdenie. Only Sberbank shares 
are ‘blue chips’; in addition, shares of Vozrozhdenie, Rosbank and Bank Moskvy 
display some liquidity; other shares remain illiquid. Vozrozhdenie’s free float is in 
the order of 0%, and that of other banks below 5%. 
IFC recognizes that the number of bank shareholders remains limited, and 
controlling stakes usually belong to one or several persons or state entities. These 
4 For instance, Russian companies and banks are persuaded that without ‘independent di-
rectors’ they will be unable to borrow from capital markets at reasonable cost nor to offer shares 
successfully to investors outside Russia. International executive search firms have all started 
‘board services’ practice in Russia to meet the booming demand for foreign ‘independent direc-
tors’ for pre-IPO companies.
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starting from early 2000s a growing share of bank owners show interest in codes 
of corporate conduct, information disclosure, dividend payments, etc. It also ap-
plies to the state in its capacity of a substantial bank owner. Institutional push from 
the government continues to exist, but this time owners of Russia’s leading banks 
do not resist the efforts of the state. CG initiatives promise more of an upside that 
outweighs consultancy and implementation costs and potential risks of disruption 
of control and management. What drives such a change? 
Russian banks feel a mounting pressure to keep up with high assets growth rates 
that gradually erode capital adequacy and demand capital growth. Endogenous 
sources of capital need to be complemented by external financing. 4% of banks 
polled by IFC (2007) intend to access capital markets with their equity issues in 
the next  years. The need to raise additional resources from capital markets drives 
CG improvements — as well as imitations of CG improvements. Positive develop-
ments in the area of CG are usually simulations aimed at a demonstrational effect 
only (Yakovlev, 200; Avdasheva et al., 2006), especially at early stages of opening 
up towards capital markets. 
The first threshold takes place in the early 2000s when Russian banks start tap-
ping external markets for debt via syndicated borrowing and subsequently Eurobond 
issues. International Monetary Fund data show that the importance of external bor-
rowings as a source of financing for Russian banks has remained steady throughout 
this decade within the range of  and 5%, although showing an upward trend more 
recently (Figure 6). In theory, better governed banks must be able to find cheaper 
funding; in practice this regularity does not consistently reveal itself. 
Shiobara (2006) believes that the potential of raising financial resources from 
capital markets through the use of CG concept may be overestimated. We see evi-
dence that currently this segment is actually the buyer’s, not the seller’s, market, 
as global liquidity abundance remove limitations from the supply of capital (both 
debt and equity). Russian banks willing to attract additional resources can do so, 
and demand for bank shares greatly outstrips supply of these instruments to out-
side investors. In view of this imbalance, would-be investors’ concerns with regard 
to CG have no effect on prices. 
Quality of CG bears more relevance for equity participation than for debt 
financing. The majority of banks interested in CG wish to integrate into global 
financial markets and/or sell their business entirely or partially. Different types of 
motivation can guide bank owners willing to sell, and CG appears as a universal tool 
of optimizing capitalization of the business and pushing upwards the price of their 
bank as multiple of its book-value. Owners may want to cash out because they: grow 
older, get tired and would like to withdraw from operational management (Yakov-
lev, 200); or want to legitimize property for which they have incomplete rights; or 
need resources to invest in more profitable sectors; or feel increasing competitive 
pressures from state-owned and foreign banks; or see no prospect for an independ-
neglect of legal institutions, insufficient protection of property rights, etc. Lend-
ers and investors favor every initiative aimed at overcoming those constraints - for 
instance, disclosure of a bank’s beneficiary owner(-s). It serves the interest of ac-
cessing Russia’s market and profitably operating here. 
Controlling owners of Russian banks 
Controlling owners of Russian banks are the category of stakeholders whose ulti-
mate interests regarding CG matter most and therefore must be understood best. As 
we argued in Section , the task of protecting the rights of bank blockholders which 
lies in the heart of CG in the ‘narrow’ interpretation (a set of mechanisms to protect 
owners against opportunistic behavior) is successfully accomplished through tradi-
tional local practices. The blockholder model of corporate control and governance 
in Russia banks does perform the intended functions: it demonstrates high effective-
ness in taking over public sector assets, redefining ownership rights, and safeguarding 
control over the acquired property against external and internal challenges. 
Although ownership and control structures of Russian banks objectively limit 
demand for modern ‘internationally-recognized’ institutions of ‘good governance’, 
Source: Central Bank of Russia, balance of payments statistics.
Figure 5: Breakdown of foreign investment in Russian banks, as percentage of total
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of CG quality through selected proxies, such as number of members of the board 
of directors, number of meetings held, number of board committees, number of 
independent directors, etc., reflects formality that may be far enough from es-
sence. Exact data on structure of ownership and control remains inaccessible for 
individual researchers. Going beyond formally reported, and often meaningless, 
data and employing unofficial sources poses a challenge to integrity of data. Rat-
ings of CG from reputed agencies, e.g. Standard&Poor’s, might be regarded as 
an acceptable proxy for CG quality, however coverage is restricted. By early 2007, 
Standard&Poor’s have assigned and published CG ratings of 6 companies, includ-
ing only one bank (see Table 2).
Table 2: Corporate governance scores (CGS) from Standard & Poor’s  (by February 8, 2006)
Global scale CGS Russia national scale CGS
Wimm-Bill-Dann Foods 
OJSC
7+ 7.7
Mobile TeleSystems (MTS) 6+ 6.9
MDM-Bank 6+ 6.7
Pipe Metallurgical Co. 6+ 6.7
Vimpelcom 6 6.4
EuroChem 5+ 5.9
North-West Telecom 5+ 5.6
MGTS 5+ 5.5
Dalsvyaz 5 5.
Sibirtelecom 5 5.
TGC- 5 5.
VolgaTelecom 5 5.
CenterTelecom 5 5.0
ТGC-8 4+ 4.8
Southern Telecom Company 
(UTK)
4+ 4.8
TGC-9 4+ 4.8
Transtelecom 4 4.
Source: Standard & Poor’s, www.standardandpoors.ru/page.php?path=enggovlist. 
look at Korean banks to trace dependencies between ownership and governance, on the one 
hand, and performance, on the other. They conclude that the level of foreign ownership has a 
significant positive association with the bank return and significant negative association with the 
bank risk. The number of non-executive directors does not seriously affect performance; however 
the presence of a foreign director on the board is significantly associated with bank return and 
risk. We believe that reducing quality of CG to composition of the board of directors is an over-
simplification.
ent private sector in Russian banking. After running their respective businesses for 
almost two decades, owners are exploring mechanisms that would allow them to 
play a different role in the company and protect their interests through the board 
of directors. In the absence of family or dynasty banking businesses in Russia, cur-
rent bank owners need to bring in professional hired managers and give them more 
power. Some owners, on the contrary, disperse the banks’ capital because they would 
like to entrench themselves, avoid being taken over by a rival, and keep running it 
unchallenged. Finally, one can identify banks whose official corporate strategies 
envisage neither a sale to strategic investors nor an IPO, so CG improvement seems 
to reflect authentic interest of bank owners. Sustainability of CG institutions in the 
absence of exogenous mechanisms of discipline (stock markets) remains to be test-
ed. It remains an open question whether these owners will ultimately be capable of 
stepping back from management. We cannot rule out that after initial experiment-
ing with CG, owners will discover the growing agency problem and its related costs 
and then fall back to the old style of governance. 
Consultants’ argument about existence of positive causality between progress 
in CG and capitalization of banks has become commonplace. Thus far Russia has 
produced insufficient empirical evidence to support this assumption. Identifica-
tion of causality between quality of CG, on the one hand, and Russian banks’ per-
formance, on the other, faces serious methodological obstacles5. Measurement 
5 Measuring the impact of CG quality on bank performance and performance of bank stock 
is a non-trivial task for all emerging markets and transition economies. Choi and Hasan (2005) 
Source: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund.
Figure 6: Foreign liabilities as a proportion of total liabilities of Russian banks













24 25
Bank valuations resulting from acquisition of Russian banks by strategic foreign 
investors reveal no consistent trend with regard to impact of CG quality (Table ). 
Causality between CG quality and the multiple of book value at which a strategic 
foreign investor agrees to acquire the bank is far from obvious. One of the highest 
multiples has been applied to the valuation of a former bridge bank that in 998–
999 received the assets and business of a collapsed bank belonging to the same 
beneficiaries in order to evade creditor claims. Strategic investors appear to attach 
higher value to factors other than CG quality, namely to bank size, market share, 
number of branches and offices, quality of assets, presence in fastest-growing mar-
ket segments like mortgage lending, car loans and credit cards. Strategic investors 
may also disregard the present quality of CG in target banks because they rely on 
strong corporate culture of parent organizations.
High expectations with regard to initial public offerings of shares by Russian 
banks do not come true. Private banks tend to sell their shares directly to strategic 
investors rather than to broad public, because the hurdles of maintaining a listed 
company status exceed the benefits, and because a sale to strategic investor can 
produce a high enough valuation. By contrast, public sector banks (Sberbank and 
VTB) have embarked on the IPO path towards greater inclusion of outside inves-
tors because it offers the state and the management a golden opportunity to en-
trench against new shareholders and to retain full control over operational activi-
ties and policies.  
Bank regulators
In 990s a large-scale importation of CG institutions to Russia does not over-
come the demand for ‘insider model’ of privatization coming from managers of 
former SOEs (Yakovlev, 200). Puffer and McCarthy (2007) look at the types of 
networks coexisting within Russia’s state-managed network capitalism and show 
that supply of institutions of a market economy by the federal government (institu-
tional push) has not been accompanied by adequate demand for such institutions 
among economic agents (institutional push). The Russian model of CG acquires 
its shape in 990s regardless of government policies; its functioning is based on a 
systemic and systematic violation of formal rules of CG (Yakovlev, 200). Govern-
ment would like to narrow the gap between spirit of new institutions and current 
practice based on motivation of economic agents. 
As regulators, the Federal Commission on Securities Market and the Central 
Bank of Russia implement CG concepts out of correct interpretation of mission 
and mandate. Additional motivation to promote good CG economy-wide is gen-
erated by peer pressure coming from foreign colleagues and international institu-
tions, as well as lobbying by groups of interest, financial intermediaries and potential 
strategic investors. Central Bank of Russia specifies the general Code of Corporate 
It is no less difficult finding solid data reflecting bank performance needed to 
build regressions on CG quality. Consistent series of data are available on profit-
ability according to Russian accounting standards that are volatile and unreliable. 
Performance of Russian bank stock resists econometric processing due to short 
period of observations; small number of bank stocks in free float on the stock mar-
ket; low share of free float; and high volatility of prices6.  Banks that have available 
ratings of CG may have no stock listed and traded (e.g., MDM Bank). Conversely, 
the most actively traded bank stock is that of a bank without published CG scores 
(e.g. Sberbank). Other banks’ stock display greater yet volatility and lower liquid-
ity. The above-mentioned factors impede regression-building between CG quality 
and stock performance. 
Table 3: Acquisition of Russian banks by foreign investors*
Target Buyer Price to book value ratio
Petroenergobank Skandinaviska Enskilda .2
Michinoku Bank (Moscow) Mizuho .
Metrobank … .9
Monchebank (Murmansk) DnB NOR 2.2
Stolichnoye kreditnoye tovarischestvo Société Générale 2.5
IMPEXBANK Raiffeisen Intl. 2.89
Median – 2.95
Delta Credit Société Générale .9
Promsvyazbank Commerzbank .
Ekstrobank Banco Santander .6
Investsberbank OTP .8
ORGRESbank Nordea .85
KMB Bank Banca Intesa .9
Rosbank Société Générale 4.0
Delta Bank GE Consumer Finance 4.5
Gorodskoy ipotechniy bank Morgan Stanley 4.9
* Includes only transactions that transfer control over the bank to the foreign party.
Source: Bankovskoye obozreniye http://bo.bdc.ru/2007/2/bank_price.htm; Boston Consulting 
Group; bank data.
6 Sberbank whose stock is the most actively traded Russian bank stock, counts with the pres-
ence of an influential blockholder, the Central Bank of Russia with over 60% of equity; less than 
20% float freely. The market for other bank stocks is less liquid, more shallow and volatile. For 
example, in January 2007 the turnover of trade in Vozrozhdenie Bank shares amounted to USD 
0 million; one speculative transaction can swing prices.
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actually complicate and impede its assimilation and integration into a global net-
work. Key managers of the acquired bank are likely to leave out of frustration with 
the integration process that takes away most of their rights and autonomy. 
Investment strategy may consist in the acquisition of a minority stake and gradual 
increase of the stake. The location of the watershed beyond which minority share-
holders obtain a chance to impact strategic decision-making and defending their 
rights, depends on the mode of functioning and effectiveness of national institu-
tions, including CG. The more mature the institutions, the lower stake ensures due 
representation of shareholder interests. Identity and profile of foreign investor(-s) 
matters as much as the size of stake. Predominantly foreign-owned banks include 
those with a single strategic investor, i.e. controlled by a single party, and those 
without such a controlling foreign owner. A minority stake held by a strategic in-
vestor (most likely, a large international bank) offers better chances of influencing 
the decisions of bank managers and changing corporate culture than a large stake 
held by portfolio investors, especially if that stake is dispersed among several par-
ties. In the latter case, control over the bank can remain in the hands of top man-
agers or even the state (Bonin et al., 2005, p. 5). 
So far strategic foreign investors in Russian banks do not show confidence in 
the quality of local governance and proper functioning of institutions that would 
defend property rights in case of conflict or opportunistic behavior. Practical ex-
periences of minority shareholders offers little encouragement8. Foreign banks 
usually eschew minority shareholder role in Russian banks, or actually regard it as 
just a transitory stage towards full control (Rosbank gradual acquisition by Société 
Générale illustrates this approach). As a proxy for the degree of confidence in local 
institutions we use the share of capital invested in 00%-owned banking subsidi-
aries in all direct foreign investment in the capital of Russian banks9. We assume 
that high share of contributions into capital of 00%-owned subsidiaries indicates 
absence of trust in the functioning of legal institutions and governance model be-
cause for strategic investors it would make more financial sense to control subsidi-
ary banks through a stake not exceeding 50% plus  share. Almost three-quarters 
of the total cumulative amount of foreign investment go to fully-controlled foreign 
subsidiary banks (Table 4). 
8 In 997–999, foreign holders of minority stakes in Russian banks found themselves ful-
ly insulated from reliable information regarding banks’ financial condition, magnitude of risks 
taken, direction of cash flows, etc. Membership of foreign investors’ nominees in the respective 
boards of directors did little to prevent asset-stripping, looting, transfer of assets to bridge banks 
and other opportunistic conduct.
9 These data might appear contradictory to the balance of payments data according to which 
portfolio investments now exceeds foreign direct investment (Fig. 4 and Fig. 5), but Table  only 
contains CBR data on registered foreign direct investment, while the bulk of foreign portfolio 
investment is concentrated in Sberbank and does not require clearance or registration with CBR.
Conduct (FCSM, 2002) in a bank-specific set of recommendations based upon 
best international practice under the title ‘Modern approaches to corporate gov-
ernance in lending organizations’ (CBR, 2005). The document is of informal and 
unenforceable nature and does not possess legal power.
The state as owner of 45% of the Russian banking system may have its own agenda 
in respect of governance in public sector banks. The Russian state is a notoriously 
inefficient and loose owner of financial assets. As a rule, state officials and public 
sector bank managers behave opportunistically, and agency costs are high. At the 
same time the real balance of interests of all parties concerned might support the 
‘blockholder model’ in the public sector. It allows the state to interfere into bank 
management and to use banks for the purposes of various policies. It also offers 
vast opportunities to insiders at public sector banks to pursue their own private ob-
jectives, including control over eventual privatizations. Yakovlev (2004b) analyzes 
evolution of corporate governance in Russia through real incentives of econom-
ic agents that may or may not go in the same direction as government policy. The 
state and its bodies avoid drastic changes in bank governance because a transpar-
ent formal system would complicate privatization of numerous minority stakes of 
the state by respective bank insiders. Once the remnants of state holdings disap-
pear, the task of capitalization of private banks will come to the fore, and attitude 
towards CG will become more constructive. One can see interest toward formal 
CG institutions among core banks firmly locked in the public sector that now try 
to access capital markets.
To sum up Section 4, the balance of interests of stakeholders has shifted in the 
direction of CG concept based on international (mainly Anglo-American) best prac-
tice. This time the institutional push from the government meets growing demand 
from Russian banks that intend to broaden their capital base. Neither of important 
interest groups resists promotion of formal institutions of CG at the present stage. 
Progress in CG goes in parallel with successful transaction involving shares of Rus-
sian banks. However, insufficient data and the presence of exogenous factors do not 
allow identifying causality between CG quality and bank capitalization. 
5. Implications for investors: Caveat emptor17
This section applies to different categories of investors buying into Russian banks. 
Investors must wonder about solidity and sustainability of new institutions and the 
extent of genuine commitment of bank owners to good governance.
An advanced system of CG should appear as an advantage from the viewpoint 
of the acquiring bank. In practice a strong system of CG in the target bank might 
7 Let the buyer beware (lat.)
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factors that predetermine such public choice we see the willingness of the state to 
preserve its own instruments of industrial, social, regional and other policies. The 
government has doubts whether after privatization banks will keep making resources 
available to those companies and projects that for whatever reason are deemed es-
sential (or ‘strategic’) by bureaucrats. Doubts grow stronger with regard to foreign 
banks as possible new owners. A more cynical explanation consists in the hunger 
for permanent sources of rent among the top brass of the government officials, in-
cluding law enforcement agencies (‘siloviki’); a genuine privatization would erode 
these opportunities. To entrench itself and retain control, the state develops hold-
ing structures of a pyramidal shape with broad foundation and narrow summit 
(Kapelyushnikov, 2005). Public sector banks may be grouped into pyramid-like 
vertical holding structures where the state controls one bank which in its turn con-
trols several [nominally independent and “private”] others, and so forth. VTB and 
Gazprombank are good examples of such practice. 
For public sector banks steady progress in CG is closely related with privatiza-
tion. We intentionally avoid calling the dilution of the government’s stake ‘a pri-
vatization’ because privatization implies a shift of control from the state to private 
owner(-s). Partial state withdrawal from core public sector banks via placement of 
minority stakes on the stock market somewhat decreases property concentration, 
but does not convert the bank into an organization run by outside investors. It is 
unlikely to result in a new model of governance or a definite departure from current 
management practices. The quality of governance might remain roughly the same 
as before, despite the corporate decorum. A broadening of the capital base contrib-
utes to the entrenchment of the top management and gives rise to agency problem. 
Market discipline, on the other hand, does not affect such an organization to the 
full extent because it continues to rely on the state as its controlling shareholder 
who will shelter it from external threats and bail it out if need be. 
At the same time, over time form can exert impact on the substance. The new 
institutions of CG that start as artificial and fight for survival begin gradually to 
shape corporate life and behavior to an ever increasing extent. The need to observe 
formalities imposed by stock market rules has a chance of becoming an effective 
constraint on an omnipotent blockholder. 
6. Implications for policy makers: Primum non nocere21
Although the blockholder model of governance now approaches its own limita-
tions in terms of financial efficiency and potential for future growth, introduction of 
2 First, to not harm (lat.)
Table 4: Breakdown of foreign contributions into charter capital of Russian banks 
(RUB mln)
01.04.2002 01.01.2003 01.01.2004 01.01.2005 01.01.2006 01.10.2006
Cumulative 
total,  
of which  679 5 887 8 90 2 55 49 555 70 798
00%-
owned 
subsidiaries 8 652 0 4  06 5 776 40 95 52 64
share, % 63.3% 63.7% 69.0% 67.0% 82.6% 73.7%
Source: Central Bank of Russia data.
The direction of change matters as well: the indicator did not fall since 200 and 
has actually increased20. Given that strategic foreign investors have at their disposal 
the corporate culture and institutions of the parent company to effectively address 
any CG issues, these investors should theoretically need 50% +  share to enjoy con-
trol over the subsidiary bank. In practice, they tend to aim for total control of their 
Russian subsidiaries and avoid buying minority stakes unless granted a solid call 
option for the controlling stake of up to 00% of shares. Assuming rational behavior 
of foreign investors (and no reason exists to assume otherwise), their preference for 
00% ownership of Russian banks tells that the threshold of control is located way 
above 50%+  share, probably close to 00%, due to the country-specific features 
of CG mechanisms and the quality of legal institutions.
It takes an in-depth case study to determine whether a particular bank owner 
shows sincere and genuine interest towards good CG or merely imitates it under 
pressure from capital markets. Investors in shares of public-sector banks, in partic-
ular, must have realistic expectations about quality of governance in those organi-
zations. Russia plans to place shares of Sberbank and VTB through the stock mar-
ket; partial divestment of state-owned company from the capital of Gazprombank 
is likely. We find more similarities between Russia’s strategy with regard to state-
owned banks and that carried out in China, not in transition economies of CEE 
(Vernikov, 2007a). Public offerings of shares aim to broaden capital base, produce 
fiscal result and absorb liquidity, but under no circumstances the state intends to 
yield control over core banks to private investors. Regardless of precise techniques 
of shares placement, the state remains the single largest shareholder (i.e. ‘block-
holder’) of the top lending organizations in Russia. We see a sign of ‘entrenchment’ 
strategy implementation by the state in the choice of stock dilution and broad mar-
ket placements over sale to a strategic investor. Among institutional and political 
20 The fall 82.6% to 73.7% over January – October 2006 may be attributed to one large acquisi-
tion of a minority share (Rosbank) with an option to buy controlling stake at a later stage.
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controlling owners of an increasing number of Russian banks play limited role in 
CG initiatives in the banking sector en large. Apart from twinning programs with 
Russian banks (some of which programs actually serve the purpose of pre-feasibil-
ity study) foreign parent banks do not objectively need CG to effectively run their 
Russian subsidiaries. CG institutions are as nominal in foreign subsidiaries in Rus-
sia as they are in most of domestic market participants. We argue in Section  that 
existence of national businesses not integrated into global structures makes CG a 
topical issue for Russia, unlike for most transition economies in Central and East-
ern Europe. Dispersed capital base of banks would complicate takeovers by global 
foreign investors. In case of an acquisition, a broad capital base ensures that the 
target bank is not converted into a mere branch of a global bank but continues to 
operate as a corporation. Diversified structure of control objectively generates de-
mand for institutions of CG that now exist only formally. 
Restriction of the power of blockholders over Russian banks would deepen fi-
nancial markets and reduce systemic risks in banking. Market discipline works better 
than regulatory pressure on bank owners alone. Emergence of genuine corporations 
in the banking industry would contribute to the regulators’ and the government’s 
goal of keeping a significant proportion of Russian banks under ‘national control’, 
whatever this ideological construction might signify. In the end of 2005 the Cen-
tral Bank of Russia put forward innovative proposals on CG that triggered a public 
discussion. In particular, CBR considers regulatory measures aimed at increasing 
depth and liquidity of the market for bank shares, e.g. obligatory public flotation 
of all banks whose size exceeds a certain threshold in terms of assets, regardless of 
their current form of ownership. Expert community is split between the need to 
create a liquid stock market and the possible outcomes of such regulatory action 
for bank owners (see: www.rusrating.ru/ru/news/story/events/Debates). Those who 
disapprove the idea of obligatory flotation argue that the regulator has no right to 
intrude in decAsions concerning private property, and that enforced flotation can 
incur losses of bank owners. 
If the Russian society and the bank regulators really are concerned with a grad-
ual replacement of private domestic banks by foreign players, then they may need 
to recur to unorthodox steps in order to overcome the blockholder model of gov-
ernance. The state might demand foreign subsidiary banks to have a certain mini-
mum share of local shareholders, in order to ensure proper functioning of all bod-
ies of management and governance (Rozinskiy, 2006). Such a measure would serve 
as an ‘intelligent’ protectionist tool compliant with WTO rules as compared to 
the now dominant blunt tools of protection. In our opinion, could come from a 
legislative cap on the size of stake that can belong to one beneficiary would work 
very efficiently. Such limitation exists in a few countries and yields positive results. 
Another far-reaching measure would be to consistently follow the Anglo-Saxon 
model by forbidding bank ownership by industrial companies and other non- 
norms and institutions of CG remains supply-driven. The difficulty of implanting 
CG in Russian banks rests in the high concentration of property, both private and 
public. In the absence of a broad investor base the allocational mechanism of the 
stock market has no chance to take off. Experiments with CG run the risk of mar-
ginalization and unsustainability. Policy makers would rather make up their mind 
soon as to which variant of capitalism they want to promote in Russia – ‘bank capi-
talism’, ‘shareholder capitalism’ or ‘state capitalism’ (state-guided accumulation 
and allocation of capital). The choice might be path-dependent to a greater extent 
than policy-makers would like. Whichever the choice, it has to be consistently im-
plemented, because a combination of heterogeneous institutions will permanently 
generate institutional conflicts.
By setting new formal institutions that affect governance the state can exert dif-
ferent kind of impact on national market participants – positive, neutral or nega-
tive. In the short run the change in the governance model may go in a direction 
that will render Russian banks less resistant to external threats. Relying on the drive 
to raise financial resources for growth, bank regulators continue to promote the 
Anglo-American concept of CG. The official doctrine has it that progress along 
the path of CG determines the level of competitiveness of Russian banks against 
foreign entrants. Propaganda spread by international consultancies and interna-
tional financial institutions unambiguously presents CG as a potential competi-
tive advantage of Russian banks, on the ground that evidence from mature market 
economies points to the existence of positive relationship between CG and per-
formance. Hopefully such evidence will emerge over time for Russian corporations 
and banks as well. In case it does not, the question will arise whether introducing 
CG was worth the trouble and the cost. 
By broadening the capital base of public sector banks and modernizing their 
governance systems the Russian state intends to foster growth of ‘national cham-
pions’. Good CG allows to access cheaper resources and thus enhances banks’ 
competitiveness vis-à-vis foreign players in anticipation of WTO membership and 
further globalization of the banking sector. At the same time, initiatives in the filed 
of CG open up the banks to due diligence by potential foreign lenders and buy-
ers, so successful introduction of CG increases chances of acquisition of Russian 
banking businesses by foreign investors. Despite positive impact from foreign capi-
tal injection on stability and efficiency of the banking sector, takeovers of Russian 
banks by foreign investors reduce the scope of domestic banking business and in-
evitably restrict the base for CG institutions. This might become an unintended 
consequence of government policies. 
Foreign subsidiary banks appear nominally as independent Russian stand-alone 
corporations in the legal form of ZAO or OOO (limited liability companies), but 
de facto function as elements of foreign business groups. Parent companies located 
abroad govern these entities as branches (Vernikov, 2005). Foreign parent banks as 
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of control clearly prevails; unaffiliated minority shareholders do not exist or are 
not represented; and stock market plays limited role in the allocation of capital. 
‘Anglo-American’ model of governance based on agency theory appears to be broadly 
irrelevant for Russian banks because it implies outsiders’ control over the company 
which does not exist in Russia. The model of governance in the banking sector dis-
plays some peculiarities with that typical for Russian industrial companies and well 
researched in the literature. The role of business groups might be less pronounced in 
banking than in mining and manufacturing; transparency of ownership and control 
is higher due to the more demanding disclosure rules imposed by the bank regula-
tor; corporate wars and hostile takeovers remain rare.
The main interested parties within the blockholder model objectively do not 
demand high quality institutions, including CG; the introduction of those insti-
tutions is driven by supply from the state. Since the beginning of this decade the 
balance shifts in favor of CG concept as it receives support from 4 groups of inter-
est, namely financial intermediaries and consultants, including international in-
stitutions; foreign lenders and minority investors; controlling owners of Russian 
banks; and bank regulators. Each of these groups pursues own agenda. Foreign 
parties wish to involve more Russian banks into the global market, with the view 
of profitable trading, lending, advisory, and acquisition. Russian bank owners be-
come interested in borrowing from the money market at reasonable cost and/or 
selling their business wholly or partly. Bank regulators implement their respective 
mandates. On the basis of this common vector of interests CG now make progress 
in the leading group of Russian banks.
Foreign financing becomes essential to Russian banks, privately-held and state-
controlled alike. Thus far evidence rather supports the assumption that improve-
ments in CG (adoption of codes of corporate conduct, information disclosure, divi-
dend payments, etc.) constitute a simulation (‘window dressing’) aimed at foreign 
investors and creditors, while bank owners give low intrinsic value to CG. As long 
as the quality of institutions does not improve, investors in Russian banks have to 
rely mainly upon the goodwill of bank owners that progress in governance will not 
be reversed. This particularly applies to minority investors in public sector banks. 
Reduction of the state’s share in core banks should not be described as ‘privatiza-
tion’ because privatization implies a shift of control from the state to private capi-
tal. That is not envisaged in Russia whose strategy regarding banks bears common 
features with China’s. Core banks will firmly remain in the public sector, and the 
state, its bodies and officials will keep exerting decisive influence. Minority inves-
tors in these banks cannot confidently expect a radical and irreversible change in 
corporate behavior and governance practice. 
The current ownership structure is likely to lead to crowding out of domestic 
private banks and their replacement by foreign and state-controlled ones. If the 
authorities prefer to see a substantial portion of financial assets in domestic prop-
financial entities. Only natural persons and their collective investment vehicles (e.g. 
mutual and pension funds) must be allowed to own bank shares. Eventual imple-
mentation of this kind of proposals would face the same obstacles as other institu-
tional innovations: corruption; ‘state capture’ by interested bank owners who do 
not wish to share control voluntarily; untransparency of ownership; weakness of 
enforcement; and conflict of interest between the state as bank regulator and the 
state as bank owner. Nevertheless, we would not overestimate potential disruptions, 
costs and difficulties, provided that there is sufficient political will to maintain ‘na-
tional control’ over banks.
However, dismantling the blockholder model of governance requires caution. 
This model originates from low quality of institutions and the credibility of external 
threats, not from bank owners’ ill will or lack of Western training. So far the envi-
ronment – primarily the degree of property rights protection – has not changed 
sufficiently to support ‘civilized’ governance and completely disregard defensive 
functions of the governance model; open transparent models of governance seen 
in the Anglo-American world might not yet fit such an environment. Raiders and 
institutional investors would love to rely on CG in order to take control away from 
company owners and managers. In mature economies corporate raider activity faces 
solid constraints that do not exist in Russia. Russian bank owners instinctively feel 
the potential threat coming from an open model of governance – hence the resist-
ance to apparently uncontroversial initiatives such as disclosure of bank benefici-
ary owners or full delegation of managerial functions to hired professional manag-
ers. If new CG rules increase the risk of undermining the control by owners and 
significantly increasing their costs, such a risk will materialize early or later. Even 
an isolated case of loss of control as a result of CG introduction would discredit 
‘best international practices’, push bank owners away from them back to reliable 
modes of control, and trigger opportunistic behavior in other banks. Improper and 
hasty implementation of institutional reforms has produced negative outcome in 
other areas. Fine-tuning of the national model of CG needs to take into account 
the transitional nature of the economy and the local peculiarities, so it happens as 
evolution, not a revolution (Radygin et al., 2004). Importantly, pressure on private 
bank owners to improve CG must be accompanied, or even preceded, by the state’s 
efforts to ensure rule of law and protection of private property.
7. Conclusions
Formal institutions of corporate governance transplanted into Russia bear little 
relation to the actual model existing in Russian banks. New institutional forms are 
either by-passed or utilized to legitimize existing practices. ‘Blockholder model’ 
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